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Abstract
In their discussion - Participative Budgeting and Participant Motivation: A Review of the Literature - by
Frederick J. Demicco, Assistant Professor, School of Hotel, Restaurant and Institutional Management, The
Pennsylvania State University and Steven J. Dempsey, Fulton F. Galer, Martin Baker, Graduate Assistants,
College of Business at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, the authors initially observe: “In
recent years behavioral literature has stressed the importance of participation In goal-setting by those most
directly affected by those goals. The common postulate is that greater participation by employees in the
various management functions, especially the planning function, will lead to improved motivation,
performance, coordination, and functional behavior. The authors analyze this postulate as it relates to the
budgeting process and discuss whether or not participative budgeting has a significant positive impact on the
motivations of budget participants.”
In defining the concept of budgeting, the authors offer: “Budgeting is usually viewed as encompassing the
preparation and adoption of a detailed financial operating plan…” In furthering that statement they also
furnish that budgeting’s focus is to influence, in a positive way, how managers plan and coordinate the
activities of a property in a way that will enhance their own performance. In essence, framing an organization
within its described boundaries, and realizing its established goals. The authors will have you know, to control
budget is to control operations.
What kind of parallels can be drawn between the technical methods and procedures of budgeting, and
managerial behavior? “In an effort to answer this question, Ronen and Livingstone have suggested that a
fourth objective of budgeting exists, that of motivation,” say the authors with attribution. “The managerial
function of motivation is manipulative in nature.”
Demicco, Dempsey, Galer, and Baker attempt to quantify motivation as a psychological premise using the
expectancy theory, which encompasses empirical support, intuitive appeal, and ease of application to the
budgetary process. They also present you with House's Path-Goal model; essentially a mathematics type
formula designed to gauge motivation. You really need to see this.
The views of Argyris are also explored in particular detail. Although, the Argyris study was primarily aimed at
manufacturing firms, and the effects on line-supervisors of the manufacturing budgets which were used to
control and evaluate their performance, its application is relevant to the hospitality industry. As the title
suggests, other notables in the field of behavioral motivation theory, and participation are also referenced.
“Behavioral theory has been moving away from models of purported general applicability toward contingency
models that are suited for particular situations,” say the authors in closing. “It is conceivable that some time in
the future, contingency models will make possible the tailoring of budget strategies to individual budget
holder personalities.”
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Participant Motivation: A Review of the Literature, Employee participation, Managerial behavior, House
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In recent years behavioral literature has stressed the importance of par- 
ticipation in goal-setting by those most directly affected by those goals. 
The common postulate is that greater participation by employees in the 
various management functions, especially the planning function, will lead 
to improved motivation, performance, coordination, and functional 
behavior. The authors analyze this postulate as it relates to the budgeting 
process and discuss whether or not participative budgeting has a signifi- 
cant positive impact on the motivations of budget participants. 
Budgeting occupies a central position in the design and operation 
of most management accounting systems. Almost regardless of the type 
of organization, the nature of its problems, and the other means for in- 
fluencing behavior, the preparation of a quantitative statement of ex- 
pectations regarding the allocation of the organization's resources tends 
to be seen as an essential feature of administrative control. Nevertheless, 
despite its wide acceptance, budgetingremains one of the most intrigu- 
ing and perplexing of management accounting procedures. With many 
fundamental questions remaining unsolved, it provides an ideal focus 
for considering some of the social and human factors which influence the 
operation of accounting systems in complex organizations. 
Budgeting is usually viewed as encompassing the preparation and 
adoption of a detailed financial operating plan, the comparison of the 
results of actual operations with those set forth in the plan, and an 
analysis and evaluation of the reasons for deviations from the plan. The 
objective of budgeting is to successfully influence how managers plan, 
coordinate, and control the activities of the company so that better 
managerial performance may result. In other words, a budget serves to 
map out the movement of an organization over a given time span so that 
it remains within established boundaries and yields the attainment of 
desired goals. 
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The planning function associated with the budget aims to quantify 
and assemble relevant data so that members of the organization will have 
specific, activity-directed goals to guide them. Planning is facilitated 
because the budget-setters must be aware of the goals and objectives 
of the organization and of the programs of activity necessary to their 
attainment.' The anticipated consequences of different combinations of 
plans made by management and the influences of the environment are, 
as far as possible, reflected in the budget. The planning function is also 
enhanced by the degree of objectivity and formalization of forecasting 
necessary in preparation of the budget. 
Coordination of the factors of production necessary to achieve the 
desired goals is improved if there are accurately developed budgets for 
the varying activities of the organization. The budget offers a formal 
statement of the planned operations of the firm and provides a basis upon 
which these activities can be related to each other. 
Control over the operations of the organization is also enhanced as 
the budget provides a basis upon which the activities of the firm can be 
assessed. Amendments to the budget may have to be made in the light 
of changing situations or circumstances, but it remains a yardstick upon 
which management may gauge the effectiveness of operations in respect 
to their contribution to the predetermined objectives and goals of the 
firm. The control function of evaluation, comparison, analysis of devia- 
tion from plans, corrective action, and feedback depend to a significant 
degree on the initial formal expression of the desired levels of activity 
(i.e., budget). 
Even though the objective of budgeting is to influence managerial 
behavior-how managers plan, coordinate, and control the activities of 
the company-our present knowledge of the mechanism through which 
or by which budgetinginfluences that behavior is, at best, incomplete. 
There have beenvery few attempts to describe budgetingin behavioral 
terms. Most budgeting and managerial accounting textbooks describe 
budgetingin terms of arelatively well-defined set of technical methods 
and procedures. Yet, how do these methods and procedures influence 
managerial behavior? In an effort to answer this question, Ronen and 
Livingstone have suggested that a fourth objective of budgeting exists, 
that of m~tivation.~ 
Budgeting Can Determine Motivation 
The managerial function of motivation is manipulative in nature. 
In this functional role, management seeks to define the environment in 
such a way as to ensure that subordinates do what is desired of them. 
In short, management desires a reasonably high level of predictive ac- 
curacy that subordinates will act in a way that leads to successful achieve 
ment of their work goals. Some of the devices that are used toward this 
end are job descriptions, procedures, rules, policies, persuasion, and 
budget. As such, management attempts to provide a series of constraints, 
pressures, or what otherwise might be regarded as conditions to obtain 
desired performance. 
The term "motivation" has a different meaning psychologically. 
Barelson and Steiner3 have defined the term as being an "inner state 
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[that] energizes, activates, or moves... directs or channels behavior toward 
goals. In short, a motive results in and hence can be inferred from pur- 
posive means-end behavior." 
Although a host of intuitively appealing theories of motivation ex- 
ist in the behavioralliterature, the one possessing the best combination 
of intuitive appeal, empirical support, and ease of application to the 
budgetary process is "expectancy theory." The basic tenet of expectancy 
theory is that an individual chooses his behavior on the basis of his ex- 
pectations that the behavior will result in a specific outcome, and the sum 
of valences (i.e., personal utilities or satisfaction) that he derives from 
the outcome. Several forms of expectancy theory have appeared in the 
literature; however, particularly applicable to the budgeting area is 
House's Path-Goal model,4 which has enjoyed substantial empirical 
support in general5 and in the budgeting area in particular.6 The model 
takes the following form: 
n 
M = I V ~ +  P, [IV, +C(P,,EV,)I ( i =  1,2, ... , n )  
where: M = motivation to work 
IV, = intrinsic valence associated with goal-directed 
behavior 
IVa = intrinsic valence associated with work goal 
accomplishment 
EV, = extrinsic valences associated with work goal 
accomplishment 
PI = path instrumentality of behavior for work goal 
attainment 
P, = path instrumentality of work goal for extrinsic 
valences 
Intrinsic rewards are those that are mediated within theindividual, such 
as feelings of satisfaction or competence. On the other hand, extrinsic 
rewards are those that are mediated outside of the individual, such as 
pay, promotion, or peer recognition. 
There are actually two levels of outcomes which are important in 
the theory. First level outcomes are the direct result of an individual 
engaging in a certain behavior, and amount to specific levels of output 
or performance, such as achieving a certain budgeted level of profits. The 
perceived level of probability of a certain behavior resulting in a certain 
first level outcome is represented by P, in the model. 
Second level outcomes are those that depend to some extent on the 
occurrence of specific first level outcomes, such as receiving a bonus or 
promotion due to meeting the budgeted profit level. The value of these 
outcomes to the individual is represented by EV, in the model. The 
perceived probability that a specific first level outcome will be followed 
by a specific second level outcome is represented by P, in the model. I t  
is interesting to note that the achievement of first level outcomes is direct- 
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lyrewarding only to the extent that goal accomplishment is found to be 
rewarding. A manager places no direct value other than positive inter- 
nal satisfactions on the achievement of the budgeted profit goal. The 
manager is really after those second level outcomes that he values and 
that are dependent in some part on the achievement of a first level 
outcome-whether he will receive them or not. 
Individuals may, however, find working toward budgeted ends 
rewarding in itself (IV, in the model); they may also find that budgeted 
goal attainment is rewarding in itself (IV, in the model). As internal 
valences, these are not associated with external rewards, but are related 
to such internal factors as feelings of self-worth and esteem. Positive feel- 
ings of achievement and competence may follow the achievement of goals. 
Budget holders also may believe that the achievement of first level out- 
comes will improve their chances of receiving valued second level out- 
comes, such as bonuses or pay raises. 
According to the model, then, individuals engage in budget-directed 
behavior because they gain some satisfaction from the behavior itself, 
experience rewarding feelings following the act of attaining the budget, 
andlor improve their chances of being recipients of second level outcomes. 
Shift Occurs in Budgetary Philosophy 
One of the first behavioral scientists to express an interest in the 
nature and consequences of the budget process was Argyris.7 In an in- 
vestigation conducted more than 30 years ago, he studied the budgeting 
practices of several industrial firms. Argyris' primary concern was to 
determine the effects on line supervisors of the manufacturing budgets 
which were used to control and evaluate their performance. His conclu- 
sions may be summarized as follows: 
Budget staff viewed their role as essentially one of criticism.They 
considered themselves "watchdogs" whose principal function was 
to constantly search for budget deviations to report to top 
management. 
Line supervisors were evaluated on the basis of reports that in- 
cluded only results without explanations. Unfavorable variances 
were highlighted, but no attempt was made to explain whether 
the causes of the variances were avoidable or unavoidable. 
Accountants were considered inflexible. They were reluctant to 
change budget standards as conditions changed. 
Budget staff was viewed as never satisfied and constantly apply- 
ing pressure for ever increasing goals. 
The budgets were unrealistic. They were purposely kept so high 
that they were impossible to meet. 
In analyzing the behavioral relationships observed in the firms under 
study, Argyris states that the core of the problem was undue pressure 
caused by the opinion of both top management and the accounting staff 
that the employees were inherently lazy. As a consequence of budget prac- 
tices that reflected their opinion, the accounting system was looked upon 
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with great suspicion and distrust, and there was a general feeling of 
hostility, and conflict between line supervisors and accountants. Fur- 
thermore, production employees banded together in groups to find ways 
of protecting themselves from the accounting system. A substantial 
amount of effort was spent in attempts to fix blame, and everyone was 
concerned with making a good showing by meeting budgets regardless 
of what this meant in terms of the best interests of the firm. Finally, due 
to the nature of the situation, the accountants were placed in a position 
where their success depended on discovering failure in others. 
There is no way of determining the extent to which budget practices 
described by Argyris were in general use at the time of his study. Nor 
is there any reliable evidence concerning the degree of such practices to 
day. Therecan belittledoubt, however, that the blatant attempts touse 
budgets as coercive pressure devices, as well as "watchdog" attitudes 
on the part of accountants, have severely declined. The dramatic shift 
in managerial philosophy over the past 30 years from that of a Theory 
X to Theory Y orientation has no doubt had profound impacts on 
budgetary practices. One notable reflection of this shift has been the adop 
tion by many firms of participative management techniques, in par- 
ticular, participative budgeting. 
Participative Budgeting Affects Motivation 
Mitchell8 has described four ways in which participative decision 
making wouldimpact upon subordinate motivation as predicted by ex- 
pectancy theory. First, a participative climate would increase the clari- 
ty of organizational contingencies. Through participation in decision 
making, subordinates would gain an increased understanding of the rela- 
tionship between behaviors and outcomes. Second, subordinates would 
select goals they highly value. I t  is logical that if one participates in deci- 
sions about various goals, this individual would select goals he or she 
wants. Third, because participation increases the control one has over 
valued outcomes, greater instrumentalities will be assigned to those out- 
comes. Finally, when people participate in the decision process, they 
become more egeinvolved; the decisions made are in some part their own. 
This increases the intrinsic valences associated with both goal-directed 
behavior and work goal accomplishment. Participative strategies are 
therefore consistent with House's Path-Goal formulation of the expec- 
tancy model. 
As applied to budgeting, participation means allowingindividuals 
who will be responsible for performance under a budget to participate 
in the decisions by which the budget is established. ArgyrisQ has cau- 
tioned, however, that for participative budgeting to be effective, it must 
be genuine. The individuals involved must be allowed to be spontaneous 
and free in their discussion, and not feel pressured to simply sanction 
management's plans. 
According to Caplanlo, the advantages to be derived from par- 
ticipative budgeting are that it helps provide operating managers with 
a sense of challenge and responsibility, and increases the probability that 
the goals of the budget will be "internalized" by those involved; that is, 
that they will accept budget goals as their own. To these may be added 
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the presumed benefit that budgeted figures are more likely to reflect reali- 
ty since they are generated by those who are knowledgeable of unit 
operations. 
Becker and Green" were some of the first to address the participa- 
tionissue as it relates to budgeting. Their approach to participation was 
in terms of its effects on group dynamics. In this regard they speak of 
two dimensions of group behavior that determine the ultimate effect of 
a participative budgeting strategy, process, and content. Process is defin- 
ed as the act of participating, along with the attendant consequences of 
that act; content is the "discussion topic" toward which are generated 
the positive or negative attitudes. According to Becker and Green, the 
act of participation enables the participants within the budgeted group 
(i.e., a division, responsibility center, or other budgetary unit) to interact 
and communicate with one another, thereby creating a high degree of 
group cohesiveness. This cohesiveness, if coupled with group norms 
favorable to the organization (favorable group content), is conducive to 
higher levels of performance. 
These particular effects of participation can be accommodated within 
the expectancy model framework. A group is cohesive when the in- 
dividual members value their acceptance within the group. Participa- 
tion in the context of a cohesive group would be a process of reaching 
consensus within the group on desirable standards of performance for 
the group. Once such a consensus has been reached as a result of the 
group's participation, it would be viewed by the individual members as 
reflecting the group's own norm. Striving to attain the agreed-upon goal 
(budget) would, therefore, increase the individual's likelihood of main- 
taining his acceptance in the group. In terms of the Path-Goal Model, 
the existence of a cohesive group of which the subordinate is a member 
enhances the extrinsic valence associated with work-goal accomplish- 
ment. With the attainment of the budget, the individual achieves not 
only the extrinsic and intrinsic valences that exist in the absence of a 
group context but, in addition, he maintains his acceptancein a cohesive 
group that can be regarded as an extrinsic valence dissociated with work 
goal accomplishment. 
I t  can be seen, then, bothin terms of Becker and Green's arguments 
and in terms of the expectancy model, that participation is likely to in- 
crease motivation to achieve the budget only when groups are cohesive 
and group content is supportive of the organization. 
Is Participation a Panacea? 
The general debate on participation is one of the most significant 
and contentious debates of our time. The increasing number who are 
stressing the need for further participation are vitally concerned with 
greater human welfare, and are generally interested in internally 
generated change over externally imposed change. Others, however, 
severely question the wisdom of such an approach, pointingout that par- 
ticipation, though perhaps conducive to greater human development and 
fulfillment, does not necessarily lead to the attainment of outcomes in 
the best interest of the organization. 
Muchis heard of Theory X versus Theory Y, people versus organiza- 
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tion, democratic versus autocratic style, and now, participation versus 
imposed control.12 Arguments for the first comparative are often ac- 
cepted as welcomed relief to the "Tayloristic" organizations of old, and, 
given the picture presented by Argyris' 1952 study, it would seem that 
such arguments are indeed valid, that they will result in more produc- 
tive organizations that are more enjoyable places to work. If manage 
ment were only to participate in making organizational decisions, their 
satisfaction and sense of autonomy would increase. They would see the 
decisions as their decisions. They would feel involved in the organiza- 
tion and their involvement would be translated into renewed enthusiasm 
and heightened motivation to be productive. Everyone, in other words, 
would be in the best of all possible worlds. 
Unfortunately, the transition from the aforementioned a priori 
arguments to empirical research results is not easily made. It  is an even 
bigger step to make that transition with respect to participative 
budgeting. Much of the problem stems from the definition of the depen- 
dent variable(s) to be studied. We would like, of course, to understand 
the causal relationship between participative budgeting and the promo- 
tion of organizational obiectives, the latter usually considered embrac- 
ing the productive beha&or of organization members. Unfortunately, 
because there are so many variables in addition to participation that bear 
upon and moderate performance (e.g., abilities, perceptions, and en- 
vironmental constraints), it becomes a practical difficulty to empirical- 
ly test for such direct relationships. Instead, most research deals with 
the effects of participation on participant attitudes, such as work motiva- 
tion, satisfaction, and involvement. This point is extremely important 
when considering research results. The key, yet perhaps invalid, assump- 
tion behind positive findings in these studies is that there is a positive 
causal link between participant attitudes and organizational objectives. 
It  is precisely this point on which many base their arguments against 
participation schemes. 
Hopwoodl3 for example, has stressed that participative techniques 
may in fact lead to dysfunctional behavior. Paraphrasing his arguments, 
participative budgetingis akin to handingparticipants a6'blank check" 
with which they will satisfy their self-serving interests at the expense 
of the organization. Stedryl4 cites several studies that lend support to 
such a proposition. For example, he notes a study done by Leavitt15 
suggested that in avariety of situations leaders who remain distant and 
aloof from their subordinates are more successful than their counterparts 
who form close personal ties with their work groups. Morse and 
Reimer16 found that participation groups experience higher levels of 
satisfaction and job involvement, but do not necessarily translate those 
feelings into concomitant increases in productivity. 
These studies simply point to the need to address the participation 
issue with closer scrutiny. Inconsistencies in the literature are extensive, 
suggesting that it is extremely dangerous to generalize the results of one 
of a few studies to all situations. The practical problem becomes one of 
identifying which conditional factors determine the wider impact of a 
particular type of participative management program. In considering 
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the review of research which follows, this point should be borne in mind. 
The results are certainly not universally applicable, nor should they be 
construed as constituting evidence in support of one general argument 
over another. 
Research Seeks to Understand Motivation 
I t  was noted earlier that the primary objectives of most profit- 
directed organizations relate to performance and productivity. I t  was 
also mentioned that due to methodological problems associated with 
measuring performance variables (especially in the ranks of management 
generally responsible for meeting budgets), management attitudes are 
frequently studied instead. There are, of course, other reasons for stu- 
dying attitudes, such as a genuine concern for employee social welfare. 
However, it is safe to assume that the primary concern in a budgeting 
context is to gain an understanding of the attitudinal effects on produc- 
tive behavior. 
A postulate of much behavioral research is that productive behavior 
is determined in large part by the internal (attitudinal) force, motivation. 
Because surrogates for motivation are relatively easy to measure,I7 and 
because of motivation's presumed effect on observed behavior, it is fre 
quently studied as a dependent variable in the budgeting research. I t  
was therefore deemed appropriate to concentrate on motivation in the 
research review in order to gain as much understanding as possible about 
the more exclusive qualitative variable of performance, and keep the 
review to a manageable size. Also considered are studies that attemp- 
ted to measure performance directly. 
One of the most significant studies dealing with the relationship bet- 
ween participative budgeting and motivation was done by Stedry.18 It 
is of interest both because of its findings and because it represents one 
of the earliest attempts to apply the methodology of laboratory ex- 
perimentation to research in accounting.19 The experiment involved ap- 
proximately 100 university students perforrningproblem-solving tasks. 
These students were divided into four groups based on the difficulty of 
the budget that they were given: low budget, medium budget, high 
budget, and implicit budget (no specific budget standard given). Stedry 
found that budget difficulty appeared toinfluencemotivation, the highest 
motivation corresponding to the students with the implicit budget, 
followed by the medium, high, and low budget groups, in that order. 
Each of the four groups was further divided into three subgroups. 
In one subgroup, the subjects were given the budget and then asked to 
indicate what they hoped to accomplish, in effect to set their aspiration 
levels. As perBecker and Green, aspiration level has been defined in the 
psychological literature as a goal that when just barely achieved has 
associated withit subjective feelings of success, when not achieved, sub- 
jective feelings of failure. Note, then, that aspiration refers to goals, 
whereas motivation is the attitudinal force that drives one toward goal 
attainment. In another subgroup, the students were requested to indicate 
their aspiration levels before they were given the budget. The third 
subgroup was not asked to establish aspiration levels at all. The results 
suggest that a significant interrelationship exists between budget levels, 
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aspiration levels, and motivation. For example, the highest motivation 
was in the high budget group that set its aspiration levels after receiv- 
ing the budget. However, the high budget group that set its levels before 
receiving the budget showed the poorest performance of all the groups. 
One possible interpretation of these findings is that when the subjects 
established their aspiration levels after receiving their budgets, the 
aspiration levels tended to reflect the performance objectives contain- 
ed in the budget. In other words, when aspiration levels were set first, 
the budget goals represented a separate and conflicting level which the 
subjects were unwilling to accept. 
Several specific points are worth noting about this important study. 
First, low budgets were usually associated with very low motivation; 
second, implicit budgets were in general associated with high motiva- 
tion; and, third, the influence of aspiration levels on motivation varied 
depending on budget difficulty and on whether the aspiration levels were 
established before or after the budget was received. The participation 
schema is therefore strongly supported by Stedry's results. 
Bryan and Locke20 approached the study of participation and 
motivation from a different standpoint. Instead of taking subjects in- 
itially similar in motivation level and then manipulating them to create 
differences, they selectedsubjects initially different in motivation level 
and employed experimental procedures directed toward making them 
similar. Their finding was that groups initially low in motivation per- 
formedbetter when given specific goals rather than allowed to participate 
in goal setting. This is contrary to Stedry 's results which suggest that 
all individuals be allowed to participate, regardless of initial motivation 
levels. Thus, even though participation may increase motivation levels 
of all motivation types, the marginal increase in motivation for groups 
initially low in motivation may be greater if goals are imposed by the par- 
ticipatory process. 
Job Performance Is Not Affected 
Other studies supporting the hypothesized relationship between par- 
ticipative budgeting and motivation include Hofstede,21 Searfoss and 
Monczka,22 and Swieringa and M0ncur.~3 Two other studies found that 
participation is positively associated with higher levels of motivation 
to meet the budget and with budget achievement." However, although 
participation tended to improve budgetaryperformance, it was unrelated 
to overall job performance. This finding leads to an intriguing issue in 
the area of performance measurement utilizing budget information. The 
issue is of concern because of its possible consequences on managerial 
motivations when their performanceis evaluated on the basis of budget 
deviations. 
Otleyz investigated the relationship between performance and the 
manner in which budget information is used to evaluate performance. 
He found that when a degree of variation from budget was used to assess 
performance, budgets were closely met (i.e., budgetary performance was 
favorable). However, when performance evaluation was based on 
qualitative factors other than budgeted standards, thedegree of budget 
variation was considerable. On considering this issue, Otley hypothesized 
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that the major reason for performance being closer to budget when 
budgetary means of evaluation are stressed is not so much that perfor- 
mance improves, but that the budget is set at more realistic levels. Fur- 
ther examination of this suspicion yielded the followinginterestingcon- 
clusion: Where aunit was thought likely to achieve alevel of profit that 
would be acceptable to senior management, its budget was set at that 
level; however, where the level of profit expected for a unit was perceiv- 
ed to be unacceptable to senior management, its budget was biased in 
an optimistic direction so as to yield a more acceptable profit budget and 
thereby pacify senior management. In the latter situation, collusion took 
place between the budget holders and their immediate superiors. Anim- 
plicit agreement existed that superiors would evaluate budget holders 
on the basis of qualitative factors rather than on quantitative budget 
information. 
Motivations Influenced by Self-Interest 
The implication of this finding is that motivations will be directed 
toward that which furthers individual self-interest. This is consistent 
with what is suggested by the Path-Goal Model. If individuals are 
evaluated on the basis of budget variances (a second-level outcome with 
negative valence), they will be motivated toward biasing budget infor- 
mation in an effort to reduce the probability of unfavorable variances 
taking place. If individuals are allowed to participate in setting their own 
budget goals, this biasing is readily facilitated. 
Theintentional biasing of budget information in order to promote 
self-interest is perhaps the greatest potential problem associated with 
participative budgeting. Schiff and Lewin26 have suggested that the 
process of preparing the budget is highly instrumental in resolving con- 
flict among the various participants regarding organizational goals and 
resource allocation commitment. In other words, a bargaining process 
is said to take place, the end result being a contracted compromise wherein 
dissonance between organization and personal goals is minimized. These 
personal goals consist of higher salaries, bonuses, and the like, which can 
be realized if the budget is attainable (second level outcomes with positive 
valence). 
According to Williarns,m, such compromises are achievable only in 
an environment that acquiesces to the existence of organizational 
"slack." Cyert and March28 define organizational slack as the difference 
between the total resources available to the firm and the totalnecessary 
to maintain the organization coalition. As the term is usedin budgeting, 
slack refers to the intentional understatement of revenues and overstate 
ment of costs. The implication is that managers consciously and inten- 
tionally bargain for slack in the budgetary process in order to achieve 
personal goals concurrently with organizational goals. 
In a study of the behavioral variables influencing budget slack crea- 
tion, Onsi29 found that slack is most prevalent in organizations describ- 
ed as having an autocratic style of management. He stated that, if an 
organization expects a manager to do no more than what the organiza- 
tion's formal control system compels him to do (Theory X), he is most 
likely to use budgetary slack to fulfill personal goals not necessarily rele 
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vant to the company's performance. From his findings, Onsi proposes 
that participation, which is a democratic process, leads to less need to 
create slack because there is a good likelihood that within such democratic 
system managers can satisfy personal goals without being underhand- 
ed with the budget. This, he suggests, is areasonable conclusion because 
participation was found to result in favorable attitudes, and favorable 
attitudes were not associated with slack creation. 
Unfortunately, such reasoning is highly tenuous. For one, Onsi's 
research was based on simple correlations which in and of themselves 
are incapable of saying anything about the direction of causality. Skond- 
ly, this proposal runs counter to Otley's appealing results which, as noted, 
suggest that participation is more rather than less, likely to result in 
budget manipulation. Although it may indeed be true that slack has 
greater prevalence in autocratic organizations than in democratic ones, 
it does not follow that participative techniques are the cause for reduc- 
ed slack creation, the incentive for which is moderated by other variables. 
Further research is necessary in this area before more conclusive 
generalizations can be made. 
Moderating Variables Broaden the Context 
Participative budgeting is used and managers are motivated in a 
broader context. In order to understand more fully the relationship bet- 
ween participative budgeting and these motivations, the analysis must 
be extended to include three additional variables which, when taken 
together, represent this broader context. These variables include themore 
enduring states or characteristics of the organization, the personal 
characteristics of the organization members, and the interpersonal rela- 
tionships between them. For purposes of exposition, these variables are 
catalogued here as organization structure, management style, and per- 
sonality attributes. 
Organizational Structure Influences Benefits 
Although the literature is in general agreement that participative 
budgeting induces motivation, it is unlikely that participation tactics 
operate equivalently in all environments. The beneficial aspects of apar- 
ticipative budgeting program appear to be a function of the organiza- 
tional structure within which it operates. 
Although there has been only limited empirical work studying the 
direct relationship between organizational structure and participation, 
some important conclusions may be reached. Additionally, there are im- 
portant ramifications concerning the fact that the environment, which 
can be controlled, affects the success of the participative budgeting pre 
cess. Through environmental manipulation, motivation may increase 
due to the enhancing effect of the participative program. 
There are two basic organization control structures common to 
business settings. The first, the decentralized structure, is characteriz- 
ed by an environment in which activities are specialized, formalized, and 
clearly defined. Areas of responsibility and authority are wellestablished 
and control is essentially impersonal. The primary features of this type 
of control system are the degree of structured activities and the organiza- 
tion's regulation of intended pr0cesses.3~ 
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The alternative to this structure of control is to centralize decision 
authority at higher levels of the organization, thus vesting power in a 
few individuals in top management positions. In this environment in- 
terpersonal relationships replace structured activities as a primary means 
for maintaining control. Child3l has shown that because the control of 
authority is vested in a small group of people in charge of the organiza- 
tion, perceived control by individuals in the lower level of the organiza- 
tion is reduced. 
Bruns and Waterhouse32 demonstrated that the psychological ef- 
fect of greater organizational structure would result in an increased 
perception of control on the part of executives. Relating this data to par- 
ticipative budgeting, it was hypothesized that the structuring of ac- 
tivities in a decentralized organization would lead to higher levels of 
perceived control and would also result in greater participation in 
budgeting. (Note that their study addressed participation as a depen- 
dent variable rather than as an independent variable; in other words, their 
study was looking at how much "participation" was taking place in the 
participative budgeting program that existed.) The finding of their study 
was that perceived control was an intervening variable between organiza- 
tional structure and participation. People in highly structured, decen- 
tralized organizations participated more in the budgetary process 
because they perceived themselves as exercising more control. 
Different circumstances were found to exist in centralized organiza- 
tions. The lack of autonomy and the existence oi"power vested in a few 
resulted in individuals perceiving themselves as having more interac- 
tion with superiors and subordinates on budget-related matters; that is, 
subordinates were more often required to explain to their superiors their 
reasons for budget variances. The study also showed, however, that the 
lack of autonomy in a centralized organization resulted in a reduction 
in interaction between superiors and subordinates in budget prepara- 
tion and in methods used to achieve the budget. As a result, budgets in 
a centralized organization appear to be a potential source of pressure. 
Similar results have been found by Merchant.33 He investigated 
how differences in corporate budgeting systems are related to corporate 
size, diversity, and degree of decentralization, and how different choices 
in system design and use are related to, among other things, manager 
motivation. The results indicate that larger, more diverse, decentraliz- 
ed firms tend to use budgetingin an administrative manner with greater 
importance placed on achieving budget plans, and greater middle 
management participation in budget-related activities. Intrinsic motiva- 
tion was found to be higher where managers participated in the budgeting 
process. 
From these studies, it may be inferred that the characteristics of a 
centralized organization are not conducive to the participative process. 
In terms of the Path-Goal Model, theinstrumentalities associated with 
valued outcomes are diminisheddue to theretention of control at upper 
management levels. 
Management Styles Have an Effect 
closely related to the aboveis the extent to which the management 
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of a company can be considered to be authoritarian. argued 
that authoritarians and people with little need for independence areunaf- 
fected by the opportunity to participate in decision making. He under- 
took a study of first, second, and third line supervisors in a delivery com- 
pany in which he investigated the effect of personal independence needs 
and authoritarianism upon participation and job satisfaction. The 
positive correlation that he found between perceived participation, job 
satisfaction, and job motivation was even greater for supervisors with 
high independence needs and few authoritarian tendencies. 
Fox35 has argued that employees who have been conditioned to an- 
ticipate and accept authoritarian management are likely to be somewhat 
disconcerted by rapid change to participation in decision making. This, 
he suggests, could cause them to become suspicious that management 
may be still simply trying to further its own ends under a new guise. 
Becker and Green36 argue that when department heads participate in 
setting budgets and then find that higher management rejects their pro- 
posals, they will hold negative attitudes toward management. A further 
problem with participative decision making in an authoritarian company, 
according to Becker and Green, is the tendency to adhere to rigid status 
differences so that persons of higher status still retaingreater influence 
over decisions. 
Hofstede3I deduced that in organizations where there are more 
non-authoritarians, personnel have more positive attitudes toward the 
budgetary system and that participation makes standards much more 
relevant for personnel. He further deduced that in organizations occupied 
by an authoritarian majority, personnel are often at first resistant to the 
use of standards, although this may gradually disappear if they par- 
ticipate in budget setting. 
From these observations, it appears that personnel acclimated to 
an authoritarian management style will, ingeneral, show little desire to 
participate in budget planning, and may, in fact, resist its introduction. 
Personality Attributes Determine Satisfaction 
Research by B r ~ w n e l l ~ ~  has shown that the relationship between 
budgetary participation and motivation is moderated by the personali- 
ty variable locus of control. His findings suggest that participation is 
most effective, both in terms of motivation and satisfaction, for "inter- 
nals" (those individuals who feel that they are in control of their own 
destinies). By contrast, individuals characterized as "externals" (those 
who attribute the results of their actions to chance, luck, or fate) are more 
motivated under conditions of low participation, that is, when budget 
goals are imposed on them. This finding may also help explain why 
authoritarians are content with imposed goals. I t  is reasonable that ex- 
ternals are drawn to organizations employing authoritarian practices, 
and therefore the effects actually captured in the abovementioned 
studies would have been due to subjects possessing external per- 
sonalities. This, of course, is merely a conjectural statement, and requires 
empirical testing. 
Swieringa and M o n ~ u r ~ ~  studied eight personality variables as 
they condition the relationship between participative budgeting and, 
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among other things, motivation. These variables were cautiousness, 
original thinking, personal relations, vigor, ascendency, responsibility, 
emotional stability, and sociability. The results of their analysis reveal- 
ed that emotional stability and cautiousness were the most important 
predictors of motivation to meet the budget. However, their conclusions 
also suggested that these personality variables may beimportant only 
in a context which begins with the company's organizational structure 
and the manner in which participative budgeting is used. 
Although relatively less research has been done in the area of per- 
sonality attributes and budgetary effectiveness, it  is quite conceivable 
that this is where future research will be most effective. Characteristic 
differences of users of accounting information have, in large part, been 
ignored by the accountants who are responsible for preparing that in- 
formation. The area of budgeting has been no exception. 
Future research may make possible the tailoring of budget goals to 
the unique personalities of individual budget holders. For example, it 
was noted earlier that individuals have different levels of aspirations when 
confronted with the same budgeted goal.40 Consider the case where ac- 
tual performance begins to deviate unfavorably from the aspired level 
of performance. At first, the individual will make an effort to correct ac- 
tual performance. If the deviation continues to increase, however, it is 
likely that he will eventually reach a point of discouragement at which 
he will give up trying to improve the situation. Certainly it is not in the 
organization's best interest to permit a person to become so discourag- 
ed that he is no longer interested in correcting the problem. 
This illustrates how individual personality differences may pro- 
foundly impact upon budgetary performance. Since individuals differ 
in their ability to withstand discouragement, it follows that they can- 
not all be treated in the same manner with respect to budget goals. The 
effective application of budgetary control, therefore, may require an in- 
timate understanding of the unique aspiration levels, motivation struc- 
tures, and other individual personality variables of the organization's 
budget holders. Participation may be one effective approach to incor- 
porating these peculiarities in the system. 
I t  has recently been stated that budgeting is not a mathematical 
exercise performed in avacuum. I t  reflects the input of individual peo- 
ple with unique personalities and motives, and it affects those people. 
Therefore, managers must recognize the human dimensions of budgeting 
procedures not only to ensure that the process is as unbiased as possi- 
ble but also to limit the negative consequences of administering the 
budgeting function ineffectively.41 
This article has addressed the question of whether or not par- 
ticipative budgeting has a significant positive impact on the motivations 
of budget participants. The dependent variable under study was pur- 
posely stated simply as "participant motivations," with no expressed 
intention of addressing a specific motivational object. The study did not 
confineitself to such possibilities as "motivations to meet the budget" 
or "motivations to engage in productive behavior. " This approach was 
chosen in order to afford a more comprehensive analysis of participation 
rights as they impact upon various motivation objects. 
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Participation Induces Motivation 
Across a broad base of empirical study, the predominant finding is 
that participation in setting budget goals induces participant motiva- 
tions "to meet the budget." According to House's Path-Goal formula- 
tion of the expectancy model, these motivations stem from positively 
valued outcomes expected to result from budget goal attainment, as well 
as intrinsic valences associated with budget-directed behavior and 
achievement. Some of these valued results include promotions, bonuses, 
recognition, satisfaction, and feelings of autonomy. 
Of particular interest is the finding that once participation enters 
the budgetary process, motivations tomeet the budget may not becon- 
gruent with organizational objectives; that is, the motivational objects 
"to meet the budget" and "to serve the organization's best interests'' 
arenot necessarily equivalent concepts. It is commonly presumed that 
participative budgeting will lead to more realistic budget estimates. This 
presumption stems from the fact that participants are closer to opera- 
tions and therefore possess a superior information set upon which to base 
forecasted amounts. The research results cited in this paper, however, 
indicate that this supposition is erroneous when budgets areused as con- 
trol devices (i.e., where budget variances enter into performance evalua- 
tions). Moreover, based on expectancy theory, these findings are whol- 
ly logical. As long as operating managers place high positive valence on 
favorable performance evaluations, it is unreasonable to expect them 
to provide realistic budget estimates if, in so doing, their evaluations are 
adversely affected. Thereasonable expectation is that managers will bias 
budgeted amounts in order to promote their own self-interests. Thus, 
a dysfunction exists when participative techniques are used in conjunc- 
tion with budgets utilized as control devices. The prescription is as 
follows: If management desires to utilize budgets primarily as planning 
devices, participative tactics are beneficial; if their desire is to use budgets 
for control purposes, their participative budgeting is likely to be detrirnen- 
tal and should not be used 
There are a host of contingent factors that must be weighed in the 
decision of what amounts and forms of participation are proper in the 
budgetary process. In addressing these factors, this study delineated 
between those that relate to the more enduring states or characteristics 
of the organization, the personal characteristics of its members, and the 
interpersonal relationships between them. Participative budgeting ap- 
pears to be more effective in decentralized organizations that practice 
a style of management not characterized as authoritarian. Theultimate 
success of aparticipative budgeting program, however, may depend en- 
tirely on the personality attributes of its participant. For example, if the 
majority of the budget holders are classified as having external locus of 
control characteristics, it is doubtful that the participative programs will 
be operational as a motivation device. 
It is in this latter area that future research will be most effective. 
Behavioral theory has been moving away from models of purported 
general applicability toward contingency models that are suited for par- 
ticular situations. It is conceivable that some time in the future, con- 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 6, Number 1, 1988
Copyright: Contents © 1987 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any artwork,
editorial, or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission from
the publisher.
tingency models will make possible the tailoring of budget strategies to 
individual budget holder personalities. Until that time, however, the ex- 
pectancy model, if properly used, can effectively accommodate strategy 
design on a broader scale. 
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